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Abstract
We propose a new method for aggregating the information of multiple reviewers
rating multiple products. Our approach is based on the network relations induced
between products by the rating activity of the reviewers. We show that our method is
algorithmically implementable even for large numbers of both products and consumers,
as is the case for many online sites. Moreover, comparing it with the simple average,
which is mostly used in practice, and with other methods previously proposed in the
literature, it performs very well under various dimension, proving itself to be an opti-
mal trade–off between computational efficiency, accordance with the reviewers original
orderings, and robustness with respect to the inclusion of systematically biased reports.
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of rankings, robustness to the inclusion of fake data.
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1 Introduction
When many reviewers rate goods or projects, the exercise of aggregating all this information
is a useful one: it helps consumers or principals to select the expected best projects, and
induces an objective price for each good that will smooth and make efficient any market
procedure. How to deal with this theoretical problem is an old issue in the literature on
voting, stemming from Arrow (1963), and has been object of discussion for many real world
applications, as the one of evaluating scientific research (Cook et al., 2005). Nowadays, it
has become a compelling exercise for big online sellers, when reporting huge feedback data
from consumers. Being able to offer a reliable aggregate ranking benefits the consumers to
recognize favorite goods, and it is a service provided e.g. by Amazon (www.amazon.com),
Ebay (www.ebay.com) and Taobao (www.taobao.com). Moreover, it is actually the core of
the service of other online sites, as Tripadvisor (www.tripadvisor.com). Many works in the
recent past have demonstrated the significance of scores and remarks given by the online
shoppers: some of them are Ba and Pavlou (2002), Pavlou and Gefen (2004), Pavlou et al.
(2007), Park and Kim (2009).
Given a set of commodities, a set of customers and the rating scores of each customer-
commodity pair, the general rating problem is to rate each commodity with a single score.
In this context, this paper aims to present a reasonable rating method, implementable in
efficient polynomial time by an algorithm, and whose results can be in accordance with most
of customers’ rankings.
The commonly adopted rating method in those real world applications is the averaging
(maybe weighted – we come back to weighted average in the conclusion), which is imple-
mentable in linear time, but has been found defective. In particular, the result of the
averaging is likely to violate most customers’ preferences (this is an issue already recognized
by Arrow, 1963), even if a coherent ranking is actually available (as in Example 1 of this
paper).1 On the other hand, more complicated methods must take into account other con-
straints. One is that in many cases most of the reviewers rate only a small fraction of all
the available goods, and it becomes useful to take into account also the weight of all this
missing information. Another one is that the computational complexity of every aggregate
rating must be taken seriously into account, because the numbers of products and reviewers
can be in the order of hundreds of thousands. So, it is important to find a good trade off
that is actually implementable by the online sites.
1See Basili and Pratelli (2013) for a recent analysis of this theoretical problem.
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We put the focus of a new rating method, that we call the network centrality method,
on the linkages established by the customers: that is, the customers’ rating actions make
two commodities related the more consumers compare both of them. If the commodities
are treated as nodes and the above linkages as edges, a weighted network will be obtained
which can comprehensively reflect the aggregate information. We do so borrowing from the
literature on complex networks that have analyzed the importance of the centrality of a
node. We adopt the Bonacich–Katz centrality (see Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001 for a fairly
recent exposition) to define a network centrality method of aggregate ranking.2
Our method is not the first one to address this issue. The underlying idea of our method
is based on the properties of a matrix representing the relations between products and
reviewers. The first method based on spectral analysis is the Analytical Hierarchy Process
proposed by Saaty (1977), which requires that all the reviewer rate all the products. More
in general, methods based on eigenvector centrality (as the one used by Keener, 1993), are
unstable, as has been shown in the literature on peer effects in social networks (more on this
in Section 2.3).
With a different approach, Kemeny and Snell (1962) proposed an algorithm to minimize
the aggregate discrepancy of an overall ranking with respect to each individual ranking,
but their algorithm is NP-hard and then not feasible for instances with many products and
reviewers. Hochbaum and Levin (2006) and Hochbaum et al. (2011) propose an approxi-
mation algorithm that works in polynomial time and approximates the one of Kemeny and
Snell (1962). In this paper we actually adopt the method of Hochbaum et al. (2011) as a
comparison with respect to our method, and the objective measure they minimize as one
of the benchmarks of evaluation. We also discuss why our method is not computationally
worse, and is less demanding in terms of memory storage.
Another important issue to consider in the online rating applications is the following.
In some cases true or fake reviewers could be maliciously biased in favor of some specific
products, and this is also an issue to consider. This can happen because single fake accounts,
known as Sybils (see Wang et al., 2013 and Cao et al., 2012), are created; or many of
them are systematically included in the system to force an intentionally biased evaluation
(a phenomenon called Crowdturfing, see Wang et al., 2012). In such cases the simple rating
method of averaging is considered a much better solution than the methods that preserve
ordering, as averaging can be thought as an unbiased estimator of the true value of the
2See Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) for a recent discussion of the applications of the Bonacich–Katz centrality
to economic environments with peer–effects.
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products when evaluations are affected by some white noise (on this, see Girotra et al.,
2010). However, the noise will have a well specified predetermined sign if it comes from
intentional manipulation, and we show that in some cases our method can overcome this
unbiased malicious noise even better than the averaging.
Summing up, our network centrality method results to have very desirable features. First,
it is algorithmically easy to compute, if compared to other measures in the literature. Then,
it performs very well in maintaining most of the original rankings of the reviewers, both on
randomly generated synthetic data, and on real data from an online rating platform. Third,
it is robust to the artificial insertion of consumers systematically reporting fake data.
In Section 2 we provide a motivating intuition for our method, and describe it formally.
In Section 3 we report results of an extensive numeric analysis that compares our method
with others. In Section 4 we apply our method to a real online dataset where people rate
movies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Intuition and theory for our approach
From now on we call goods the items to be evaluated, being projects or commodities, and
agents the reviewers that independently evaluate a subset of the goods. We then consider
implicitly a principal that wants to aggregate all this information in a single vector assigning
a score to each good. This will be the rating problem. A rating method is an algorithm that
provide a solution. We will consider different measures to evaluate rating methods.
2.1 Intuition
Let us start with an example that provides the intuition for our method. In a rating environ-
ment where agents assign marks (from 1 to 5) to products, consider the situation illustrated
in Table 1.
Agents
Products 1 2 3 4
a 2 − 4 −
b 1 1 5 5
c − 2 − 4
. (1)
What is the score that we should attribute to product b from this table? The situation here
is fully symmetric between two agents attributing a mark of 1, and the other two attributing
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a mark of 5. This symmetry is not only in the grades they attribute to good b, but also in
the overall marking above all products, as depicted by the blue lines in Figure 1: this is a
network where nodes are all possible marks for all goods, and there is a link between two
nodes if at least one agent gave those specific two marks to those two goods.
Now suppose that a new agent 5 enters and assigns marks only to products a and c, as
depicted in Table 2, where a new column has been added.
Agents
Products 1 2 3 4 5
a 2 − 4 − 3
b 1 1 5 5 −
c − 2 − 4 2
. (2)
Apparently this adds no information on the value of product b. However, if we look at Figure
1 this breaks symmetry: now this new agent (the red link) agrees on product c with an agent
that gave a low mark to product b. If we want to assign some value to this new piece of
information we will give more weight to mark 1 for good b, or equivalently a higher weight
to node b1 in the network of Figure 1.
2.2 Formal Model
In general, a rating problem can be formalized and solved in the following way. Consider M
goods that receives marks from 1 to a ∈ N, from N agents. An agent n will typically assign
marks only to a subset of kn out of the M products, and consequently assign no mark (the −
symbol) to all the other M −kn products. We will say that xi ∈ Sn if agent n assigns mark i
to product x. This environment can be represented by an N ×M matrix with elements from
{1, . . . , a}∪{−}, which will typically be sparse (i.e. with many ‘−’ elements). We call r this
matrix, so that ri,m is the mark (or the − symbol) that agent i assigns to good m.3 Another
way to represent this environment is with an undirected weighted network with a ·M nodes
(one for every possible non–blank mark for each product) and where links are weighted in
the following way. The weight of a link between node xi and different node yj is given by
the formula
`xi,yj ≡
∑
n∈N
1
kn − 1 (Ixi∈Sn · Iyj∈Sn) , (3)
3We will come back to this representation when analyzing other ranking measures in the literature, in
Section 2.5.
5
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Figure 1: The network representation of Table 1 (the blue lines) and Table 2 (including the
red line).
where Ix∈X is the indicator function that has value 1 if x is an element of X, and has value 0
otherwise. We set by definition `xi,xi = 0, so that there are no links from any node to itself.
What formula (3) says is that if an agent n, who already marked kn products, assigns mark
i to good x, then this will add a value of 1
kn
to each link between node xi and all those nodes
yj already assigned by agent i and present in the set Sn. Algebraically this just adds an
aggregate value of 1 to all the links of node xi. We call L the symmetric aM×aM adjacency
matrix obtained from (3).
If we sum any row or column of this matrix, say the one labelled xi, the result is∑
yj 6=xi
∑
n∈N
1
kn − 1 (Ixi∈Sn · Iyj∈Sn) =
∑
n: xi∈Sn
kn − 1
kn − 1 = |{n : xi ∈ Sn}| ,
where the first passage is due to the fact that each agent rating xi puts node xi in relation
with other kn− 1 nodes. So, the sum on each row or column of matrix L is just the number
of agents that actually rated good x with mark i. In other words, in this network the degree
of a node is just the amount of i marks provided to x by the N agents. However, as is well
known from network theory (see e.g. Newman, 2003 or Jackson, 2008), the degree of a node
is only one piece of information about its role in the network structure. Going back to the
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example in Figure 1, even if nodes b1 and b5 have the same degree, node b1 is more central
in the network, because there are more other nodes connected to it.
A more accurate way to measure centrality is to consider network paths. A network path
is a set of links that connects indirectly two nodes. In the network representation of our
rating environment a path of length d is given by d ordered agents who, pairwise, agreed on
the same mark to assign to the same product. In Figure 1, considering all links, there is a
path of length 3 between a2 and a3 because agent 1 picked a2 and agreed with agent 2 on
b1, then agent 2 agreed with agent 5 on c2, and finally agent 5 picked a3. The fact that this
path passes through b1 and c2 assigns some structural centrality to these two nodes. Let us
be more formal, the weight of the paths of length 1 between any two nodes are represented
by matrix L itself, those of length 2 are simply described by its square L2, and so on, with
longer paths that are exactly represented by higher powers of matrix L. If we call I the
aM × aM identity matrix, and 1 the column vector made of aM ones, the Bonacich–Katz
centrality c of a node is given by the implicit formula (see also Newman, 2004 and Opsahl
et al., 2010)4
c = βLc ,
that can be made explicit5 by its unique solution
c = βL1 + β2L21 + β3L31 + . . .
= (I − βL)−1 1− 1 . (4)
Parameter β > 0 plays the classical role of a multiplicator factor, and tells us how much
we want to decrease the weight of longer paths. Element L1 in the second line of equation
(4) is exactly the vector that counts the degree of each node, while the following elements
consider larger paths.
So, to attribute a score to product x one can make an average of all the possible marks
for this product (i.e. x1, x2, . . . , xa), weighted by their centrality:
sx =
∑a
i=1 cxi · i∑a
i=1 cxi
. (5)
4It is also possible to assign centrality studying the spectral analysis of L and assign weights with the
eigenvectors corresponding to larger eigenvalues. However, as pointed out in Bonacich and Lloyd (2001),
this is an approach that is much less robust to perturbations. More on this in Section 2.3.
5As long as β is not greater than the inverse of the maximum eigenvalue of A. Also this will be further
discussed in Section 2.3.
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This score takes into account the aggregate information of the whole network and the cor-
relations between the opinions in the overall poll of agents. In this way we obtain a vector s
that is our solution to the rating problem, and we call it the network centrality (NC) method.
An important property of equation (5) is that at the limit of β → 0 it coincides with the
simple average, which is what would be obtained truncating the second line of equation (4)
after the first element βL1.
2.3 What is the best value for β?
Variable β represents the peer effect between neighboring judgments in the adjacency matrix
L of all possible ranks for each product. The best value for β may clearly depend on the
other variables of the problem, and in particular on the adjacency. From the way it is built
(equation (3)), matrix L is an aM × aM symmetric matrix with all non–negative entries.
It is well known (see e.g. Bramoulle´ et al., 2014) that the strength of the peer effect
depends on the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. From the Perron-Frobenius
theorem, the largest eigenvalue of L is its unique positive eigenvalue λ+, that lies in the
interval (0, N).6
One possibility is simply to balance the peer effect of the network structure with some
β that is inversely proportional to N , or to do it with a β that is inversely proportional to
the actual λ+ of matrix L. In the simulations of next section we try the following 6 values
for β (in decreasing order): 1/λ+, 1/N , 1/5N , 1/10N , 1/25N and 1/50N . Actually, when
β = 1/λ+ equation (4) is not defined, because the matrix becomes singular. However, at
this limit c approximates the eigenvector of L corresponding to λ+,7 and this is what we
compute in this case.
At the other side of the interval, at the limit β → 0 the NC method will coincide with
the average. So, we conjecture that the larger the value of β, the better, but there is a trade
off at 1/λ+, which is the actual limit to stability of the infinite series in equation (4). So, we
try also an intermediate value between the first two, which is 2/(λ+ +N).
6Actually, by the Perron–Frobenius theorem λ+ is the unique strictly positive eigenvalue. Consider now
that the sum of the elements in each row of column xi is the number of agents that actually rated good x with
score i, and this number is cearly bounded above by the total number N of reviewers. So, any eigenvalue of
the matrix (which is how much the corresponding eigenvector is multiplied in the matrix product) cannot
exceed N in absolute value.
7It is also well known, as discussed in Bonacich and Lloyd (2001), that this limiting result converges on
a path that is extremely volatile to tiny fluctuations.
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2.4 Objective measures
How do we compare different rating methods? Any method that aggregates the score from
an N ×M matrix of marks will result in an M vector s ∈ [1, a]M , where [1, a] is the set of
real numbers in–between 1 and a. When many data in the N ×M matrix r of marks are
missing, simple correlation between this vector s and the rows of the matrix are ambiguously
defined and difficult to interpret.
One methos that has recently been proposed in the literature is the Separation–Deviation
(SD) methos provided in equation (8a) of Hochbaum et al. (2011), which stems directly from
the work of Kemeny and Snell (1962). We adapt it here to our notation. They find the vector
s that solves the following minimization problem
min
s
α
(
M∑
m=1
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
wkij (si − sj − ri,m + rj,m)2
)
+
(
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
vki (si − ri,m)2
)
,(6)
such that wkij =
{
1 if ri,k 6= − and rj,k 6= −
0 otherwise
and vki =
{
1 if ri,k 6= −
0 otherwise
,
where α is a positive real number that weights how much the first part of the objective
function (the separation penalty) is relatively important with respect to the second part
(the deviation penalty). We impose α = 1 and call SD measure the objective function of the
problem in (6). This optimization problem is not trivial (more on this in Section 2.5 below),
but its solution is obtained from a system of linear equations, so it is generally unique.
However, this measure has a huge variance across different random realizations of matrix
r. As we have checked in the simulations (see Section 3 below), the value of this objective
function computed in the optimum and the value computed on the simple average are not
different with statistical significance over random realizations of matrix r. Also, when we
apply this measure to real data in Section 4 we observe that any method does not differ from
any other with respect to this measure of more than 1%.
The measure that we will use to evaluate the performance of a measure s is the Kendall’s
Tau, as used in Vanhoucke (2010), where the relation between s and rk, on each couple of
goods i and j, is given by the following formula:
Cij =

0.5 if (rk,i = ‘−′) or (rk,j = ‘−′)
otherwise
1 if (si < rk,i and sj < rk,j) or (si > rk,i and sj > rk,j) or (si = rk,i and sj = rk,j)
0.5 if (si = rk,i and sj 6= rk,j) or (si 6= rk,i and sj = rk,j)
0 otherwise
.
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The Kendall Tau correlation between s and rk is given by
τk = 4
∑M−1
i=1
∑M
j=i+1Cij
M(M − 1) − 1, (7)
which lies always between −1 and 1. And finally, the aggregate Kendall Tau correlation
between s and r is given by the average τ =
∑N
k=1 τk/N .
The analogy of this measure with the SD function of equation (6) are that absent marks
have weight 0 in the overall computation. However, it differs in two ways: first, as the simple
correlation, this measures increases with higher correlation; secondly, it is only an ordinal
measure, in the sense that only the ordering between numbers is important. We show in
next section, when presenting the output of our simulation exercise, that this measure has
the necessary stability that guarantees identification of better methods.
We end this section with a simple example.
Example 1. Consider a simple case of three goods and four agents, depicted by the following
table:
Agents
Products 1 2 3 4
a 4 − 1 1
b − 2 2 3
c 5 1 − 2
. (8)
In this case, averaging, we assign values (2, 2.33, 2.67) to the goods, and this conflicts
with the rankings of agents 2 and 4. A ranking that instead value first good 2, then good
3 and finally good 1 would respect the order of each agent. If we look at the network
representation of Figure 2, analogous to the one in Figure 1, we see that agent 1 is just
an isolated component of the network, so that its scores have little in common with other
agents.
Table 9 shows the outcome of the SD method and of the simple average, with respect to
our NC method, with the values of β listed in Section 2.3 (in this example λ+ is 1.560 and
N = 4). It is clear from here that as β → 0 we asymptotically approximate the average.
The last two lines report the SD measure and the Kendall’s Tau of each method. The NC
method with β = 2/(λ+ + N) is the second best with respect to the SD measure (which
is the measure that the SD method minimizes by definition). The two NC methods with
higher beta’s are also those that preserve the correct ordering in the ranking of the products,
as shown by the Kendall’s Tau. This example anticipates the results that we obtain from
simulations and from an application to real data in Sections 3 and 4.
10
  Products
 Marks
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Figure 2: The network representation of Table 8 (bolder lines have higher weight).
Table 9: Different methods applied to the example of Table 8.
products SD Avg β = 1/λ+ 2/(λ+ +N) 1/N 1/5N 1/10N 1/25N 1/50N
a 1.667 2.000 1.000 1.783 1.879 1.982 1.991 1.997 1.998
b 2.889 2.333 2.302 2.325 2.330 2.333 2.333 2.333 2.333
c 2.444 2.667 1.403 2.322 2.460 2.632 2.650 2.660 2.663
SD measure 18.111 22.380 24.438 20.580 21.111 22.100 22.218 22.292 22.310
τKendall 0.5 0.1667 0.5 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
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2.5 Computational efficiency
The infinite sum in the second line of equation (4) can be truncated at the ith step, and so
its computational cost can be arbitrarily reduced at the expenses of accuracy. In fact, at the
limit β → 0 we have the truncation i = 1 and the NC method coincides with the average,
whose computational cost is linear. However, the infinite series is perfectly computed in the
third line, and matrix inversion is a very well studied problem. Actually, Williams (2012)
has recently proposed an algorithm that computes the inverse of a general n × n matrix in
O (n2.373) computational time.8 So, our method needs to invert an aM × aM matrix, where
a is a constant, and can then be solved in O (M2.373) computational time.
Hochbaum and Levin (2006) and Hochbaum et al. (2011) discuss how their SD method,
from equation (6), can be solved in O(MN log(N2/M) logN) time, constructing first an
NM ×NM adjacency matrix, and then applying the minimum cut problem to the network
resulting from that matrix, with the algorithm proposed by Ahuja et al. (2003). When N is
large, and even exceeds M1.373 (as can easily be the case in the online applications that we
have in mind) their method is clearly slower and requires much more memory than the one
we propose.
3 Simulations
We test the quality of our method, with the values of β listed in Section 2.3, with respect to
the SD method and to the simple average, on synthetic data generated in the following way.
We consider a = 5 (so, five possible scores) and N = 10 (ten agents). For M , the number
of goods, we have two cases: M = 10 and M = 50. Each consumer i rates randomly, with
i.i.d. probabilities, in the following way: each good j is not rated with probability 1 − p
(so that ri,j = ‘−′) and rated with probability p. When rated, ri,j has on of the 5 possible
values from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with uniform probabilities. In this way every single element of the
matrix ri,j is i.i.d. wit respect of all the others, and a fraction 1− p of them are expected to
be empty: ‘−′. First, we analyze how the different rating methods perform with respect to
the Kendall’s Tau correlation from equation (7), in the two cases with N = 10 and N = 50.
Then, in the case M = 50, we check for robustness of different measures when additional
agents with systematically biased reports are added to the sample.
8Even if faster algorithms provide good enough approximate solutions when the original matrix is suffi-
ciently sparse. On this see e.g. Amestoy et al. (2012).
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3.1 Kendall’s tau correlation
For both cases M = 10 and M = 50 we generate 200 i.i.d. realizations of r, for 13 evenly
spaced values of p in–between 0.4 (less than half of the goods are expected to be reported by
each agent) and 1 (all goods are reported by each agent). For each realization we compute
the average mark for each good, the measure resulting from the SD method of Hochbaum
et al. (2011), and our centrality measure with respect to the 7 different values of β discussed
in Section 2.3: largest eigenvalue λ+ of the L matrix, 1/N , 2/(λ++N), 1/5N , 1/10N , 1/25N
and 1/50N . Finally, for each of these M–dimensional vectors of measures, we compute the
Kendall’s Tau correlation from equation (7).9
Results of the average outcomes are reported in the upper parts of Figures 3 (for M = 10)
and 4 (for M = 50). From these average trends, it comes out clearly out that SD is the
best performing measure, and that average is the worse, while the centrality measure with
different values of β lie in–between. The best value of β seems to be 2/(λ+ +N). However,
we need to take variance into account when analyzing these results. In Appendix A, Figures
6 (for M = 10) and 7 (for M = 50) report the boxplots of all the 200 realizations for the
following three measures: DS, average, and NC measure with β = 2/(λ+ + N). The lower
parts of Figures 3 (for M = 10) and 4 (for M = 50) take also variance into account and plot
the Student’s t–test to check if the centrality measure with β = 2/(λ+ + N) is statistically
different from the SD measure and the simple average, as p changes. When M = 10 the NC
measure is not statistically different from the other two measures for most values of p: it
performs significantly better than the average for high p, and significantly worse than the
MS measure for low p. But when M = 50 the NC method is always better than the average
with 99% statistical confidence, while it is not statistically different form the MS measure
for p above 0.6.
We have tried, on the same set of simulations, also two other measures of coherence: the
objective measure from equation (6) and the simple average correlation of a method with
those of all the agents (limited for each agent to those goods that are actually rated by
that agent). However, those two measures have a much larger variance than the Kendall’s
tau correlation, and all the outputs are not statistically different, according to the Student’s
t–test, in any of the points presented in Figures 6 and 7. The reason is clearly that while
Kendall’s tau correlation is penalized only by violations in the ordering, and is hence ordinal.
the measure from equation (6) and the simple correlation are cardinal measures that are
affected also by the magnitude of the scores.
9The Matlab codes are available at http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/paolopin/WP/codes_LPW14.txt.
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Figure 3: Average outcome of the Kendall’s tau measure on the simulations, with 9 different
methods, p varying from 0.4 to 1, and M = 10. Lower plot shows Student’s t comparison
between one of the NC methods with respect to average and SD.
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Figure 4: Average outcome of the Kendall’s tau measure on the simulations, with 9 different
methods, p varying from 0.4 to 1, and M = 50. Lower plot shows Student’s t comparison
between one of the NC methods with respect to average and SD.
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3.2 Robustness to biased fake data
Now we pose a different question: what happens to the ranking measure that we are using
if we add fictitious agents that adopt a systematically biased report? To do so we consider
the previous case with N = 10 and M = 50, and we add H agents (with H from 1 to 5)
to the original 10 ones. These agents just assign mark 1 to the first three goods in the M
list, and mark 5 to the last three ones (it is clear that the order of the goods plays no role,
and the point is just that some goods are systematically rated at the top, while others are
systematically rated at the bottom).
In this scenario it is not clear which measure preserves better the original ranking from
the inclusion of fake reviewers. In principle, a measure should detect that those new agents
are somehow different from the original ones. The NC measure does exactly this, because
the sub–network generated by the new fictitious agents will be an almost disconnected part
with respect to the original network.
As a measure for our simulations we use the difference between the Kendall’s tau cor-
relation index computed on the measure obtained aggregating all the consumers, and the
Kendall’s tau correlation index computed on the measure that would have been obtained
only from the original reviewers. Clearly, this difference will be negative, but a good mea-
sure will be one that minimizes it in absolute value. With the same notation of last section,
Figure 5 reports the outcome and the t–test (and Figure 8 in Appendix A the boxplots).
The results speaks in great favor of our NC method: when up to 2 fake reviewers are
added to the original 10 ones, the NC measure with β = 2/(λ+ +N) is better than any other
measure with high statistical significance. When more fake agents are added it improves its
outcome with respect to the SD measure, but it becomes worse than the average with more
than 99% statistical significance.
16
Figure 5: Average outcome in the simulations of the difference in Kendall’s tau measure,
between the original data and those obtained adding X fake. There are 9 different methods,
and X varies from 1 to 5. Lower plot shows Student’s t comparison between one of the NC
methods with respect to average and SD.
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4 Real data
Finally, we test our method, with the values of β listed in Section 2.3, with respect to the SD
method and to the simple average, on a real dataset. In this case we consider all measures of
efficiency, and as it is a single realization we will not be able to compute statistical significance
when the outcomes are different.
We use a dataset recording rating information on movies provided by the site grouplens.
org, from the University of Minnesota.10 The data set encompasses 943 customers and 1682
movies. It records the rating scores of each movie rated by its customers. All the movies
are rated from score 1 to score 5, with 1 as the worst and 5 as the best. The total amount
of rating records are about 100,000, so each customer rated on average about 106 movies
which is far less than 1,682. Such sparse data would pose a challenge for many of the
existing evaluation methods. Also, the SD method would need to construct a matrix of size
(NM)2 > 2.5 · 1012, in order to apply the minimum cut algorithm of Ahuja et al. (2003).11
For our NC method we need instead to invert a matrix of size (5M)2 ' 7 · 107, which is
tractable.
Table 10: Different methods applied to a real dataset.
‘Movielens’ dataset
Method τKendall · 10−5 Correlation SD value ·107
β = 1/λ+ 0.48 0.4256 1.699964
β = 2/(λ+ +N) 0.61 0.4208 1.692521
β = 1/5N 0.55 0.4205 1.692400
β = 1/10N 0.53 0.4202 1.692308
β = 1/25N 0.52 0.4202 1.692302
β = 1/50N 0.52 0.4202 1.692294
Average 0.44 0.4202 1.692244
SD 0.63 0.4099 1.691011
The results are consistent with those of the simulations. The NC method with β =
2/(λ+ + N) performs almost as well as the SD method with respect to the Kendall’s tau
10The actual dataset is called movielens and is part of an academic project of the University of Minnesota
on Social Computing. ‘Movielens’ is presented as a tool for rating and comparing movies: anyone can
register, rate and consult all the movies from a fixed list. The version we analyze has been downloaded by us
in December 2013, and are available at http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/paolopin/WP/movielens_LPW14.
data.
11We have computed directly with Matlab the direct optimization of the objective function in (6).
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correlation. It is surprising that the SD method is actually the worst one with respect to
the simple correlation, but we have discussed in Section 2.4 how it is difficult to interpret it
when many missing data are present, as in this case. Finally, the SD method, by definition
minimizes the objective function from equation (6), and with this respect the NC method
is not better than the simple average, even if all the numbers are very similar and there
is no clear added value in not adopting the simple average. Actually, in relative terms the
difference between the NC method with β = 1/λ+ and the SD method is about 0.5%.
5 Conclusion
We have provided a network centrality rating method for aggregating the overall information
of consumers rating products. We argue that it is an optimal trade–off between computa-
tional efficiency and desirable features, especially when compared with the simple average
and with other methods proposed in the literature. However, the methods actually used
by online sites are not evident, and consumers can only perceive them as black–box. The
algorithms implemented there are probably very sophisticated, and make use of many more
information than those we have considered in the present paper. For example, the popular
site www.tripadvisor.com, that is actually based only on its rating service, declare that it
gives different weights to different reports depending on the importance of the reviewer and
on the timing, attributing higher value to more recent reports.12 The service of aggregating
ratings could be also customized upon request, as the importance could be assigned in a
way that reviewers with certain characteristics are given more or less weights depending
on who performs the request. What we want to stress here is that attributing different
weights to consumers or to single reports is something that can easily be done in any of the
methods we have compared, including the average and our NC method. Actually, showing
that at the limit of β → 0 our NC method actually coincide with the average, we provide
continuity between any weighted average method and the corresponding NC method with
β > 0. So, the horse–race exercise that we have performed would not be affected by this
extra differentiation.
Also, we have shown that our NC method is, in some cases, the best one in neglecting
the score of systematically biased fake reports. It is clear that knowing who this fake and/or
biased consumers are will help in disregarding their value, as one could give them less or
even zero weight, but our NC method does it generically by its own nature, starting ex–ante
12This is for example explicitely stated in the following two urls: http://help.tripadvisor.com/
articles/200613987 and http://help.tripadvisor.com/articles/200614027.
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with equal weights and no extra information.
So, any other additional information or algorithm that can distinguish the importance
of reviewers and even single reports will be helpful for our method, as for any other one,
but it is orthogonal to the properties that we have shown in the present paper. In this
sense, we provide an additional tool that can be implemented in real world applications,
and we show that its properties are very useful in obtaining an aggregate rating measure
that preserves the original ranking made by reviewers, and is able to detect, without any
additional information, those reviewers that are under suspicion of being not genuine.
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Appendix A Boxplots from the simulations
For the three sets of simulations discussed in Section 3, we report the boxplots of all the
200 outcomes on each set of variables, for the NC method with β = 2/(λ+ + N), the SD
method, and the simple average. On the y–axis we report all the cases, and on the x–axis
we report the measures: Kendall’s tau for the simulations discussed in Section 3.1 (Figures
6 and 7) and the difference between Kendall’s tau measures, that we call robustness, for the
simulation discussed in Section 3.2 (Figure 8). It is clear that there is a large variance and
many realizations overlap, and this is why we show in the figures of the main text also the
outcome of Student’s t–tests to check when these outcomes are statistically different.
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